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Introduction  
This paper examines the economic crises affecting Ireland, Sweden, the United States (US) and 
Mexico at the start of the 1980s in terms of their impact upon these countries’ macroeconomic 
policies.  The four countries were selected for examination as they encompass presidential, 
parliamentary, republican, constitutional monarchical, federal and unitary systems of 
governance.  Two are European states and two are from the Americas, two are large economies 
while two are small, finally while three of these countries were democracies, Mexico was not a 
fully functioning democracy at the time.  Thus, they encompass an interesting selection of 
various types of states.  Macroeconomic policies were selected for examination as commentators 
(academics and journalists) tend to focus primarily upon macroeconomic policy instruments, 
while dealing with the broader sweep of policies affected at the time would have required more 
space that is available here.   
Each country’s response to the crisis afflicting it, tempered as it was by a combination of 
historical and political factors, provides an insight into that political economy.  These findings 
also enable us compare and contrast the nature of each crisis and the policy responses each 
country adopted.  As Blondel (1995: 3) points out, through studying politics comparatively we 
can discover trends, and achieve an understanding of broader characteristics (Blondel, 1995: 3).  
The value of comparison is in the perspective it offers, and its goal of building a body of 
increasingly complete explanatory theory (Mahler 1995; Mayer et al. 1993).   
 
 
The Policy Change Literature 
Policy change is a complex process, and must be seen in the context of societal and political 
change (Feldstein, 1994).  A crisis implies prevailing policies cannot be sustained without 
deterioration (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995: 14).  An economic crisis can influence policy 
preferences leading to policy change (Stevenson, 2001: 621).  Due to the complexities in trying 
to understand the nature of policy change, the issue has been approached from a variety of 
perspectives. 
Advocacy collation theory focuses on coalitions sharing core policy beliefs, on policy-
oriented learning, to explain radical policy change (Meijerink, 2005: 1061).  An advocacy 
coalition consists of ‘elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers who share a 
particular belief system’ (Sabatier, 1988: 139).  The epistemic communities explanation focuses 
on networks of individuals who share policy relevant knowledge as they seek to achieve policy 
change (Haas, 1992: 3).  According to the advocacy coalition approach, for policy change to 
occur, an external shock is required, such as a macroeconomic crisis (Sabatier and Jenkins-Simth 
1999; Nohrstedt, 2005: 1042).  For the epistemic community approach, policy change may be 
triggered by uncertainty over the seriousness of problems in the polity (Meijerink, 2005: 1063). 
Based on the concept of windows of opportunity the policy streams approach to policy 
change incorporates a role for the policy entrepreneur in engendering change (Kingdon, 1995; 
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Zahariadis, 1999). Windows of opportunity arise due to exogenous shocks (Garrett and Lange, 
1995).  For policy change to occur, when a window of opportunity forms, policy entrepreneurs 
attempt to gain political support for the solutions they put forward (Zahariadis, 1999).  To do 
this, policy entrepreneurs link problems, ideas, and politics to draw attention to issues and bring 
them onto government agendas (Mintrom and Norman, 2009: 655). 
 For Baumgartner and Jones (1993), the process of policy change is marked by long 
periods of stability disrupted by instances of radical change.  The punctuated equilibrium 
approach illustrates how policy entrepreneurs opposed to extant policy develop alternative ideas, 
and seek support for this new idea.  For policy change to occur, opponents of extant policy must 
create new perceptions of the issue at stake, and search for support for their newly created policy 
ideas (Meijerink, 2005: 1064).  If they gain support at a high administrative level significant 
policy change may follow.  The critical junctures framework, developed by Hogan (2005; 2006) 
and Hogan and Doyle (2007; 2008), and perfected by Hogan and Cavatorta (2013) and Hogan 
and O’Rourke (2015) formalized this argument.  It posits that a critical juncture is made up of 
three sequential events: crisis, ideational change, and policy change.   
A growing body of literature is devoted to identifying aspects of incremental policy 
change.  This recognises continuity during upheavals, and gradual change in times of peace that 
eventually become transformative (Djelic and Quack, 2003: 309–10; Thelen, 2004: 292).  
Institutions and policies change in subtle, but often significant ways, by a variety of mechanisms, 
including layering, conversion, displacement and drift. Layering is the placing of new 
constituents in established institutional frameworks.  Conversion is the integration of new groups 
into institutions, forcing change in the roles these institutions perform.  Displacement occurs 
when new models emerge, calling into question existing organizations (Streeck and Thelen, 
2005: 19), while drift refers the absence of institutional stability (Thelen, 2004).  As Sheingate 
(2003: 186) argues, to provide a nuanced account of policy change, we must move beyond the 
conception of institutions as bastions of equilibrium. 
 Thus, the literature looks primarily at the importance of external shocks for initiating 
policy change.  However, policy change may be triggered by uncertainty as to the problems in 
the economy.  The key players in policy change literature are policy and political entrepreneurs, 
and coalitions of actors sharing a common belief or policy relevant knowledge.  The key concept 
in the policy change literature is ideas, extant ideas that underlie existing policies, and alternative 
ideas that attack current policies.  Thus, the literature sees these components as critical to the 
policy change process. 
 
 
The United States of America 1980/1981 – The State of the Economy 
From the late 1960s onwards US domination of world commerce began to wane as the country 
labored under the burden of deficits from the Vietnam War, the Great Society program, an 
explosive expansion in the workforce, unemployment, and growing foreign competition.  The 
enduring recession brought on by the 1973 oil crisis only exacerbated matters.  During the 1970s 
Presidents Nixon and Ford attempted, and failed, to curb inflation, and cure the recession, 
resulting from the oil crisis. 
Democratic Party candidate Jimmy Carter was elected President in 1976.  At first, Carter 
pursued expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to reduce unemployment, but a surge in 
inflation halted this.  The oil price increases resulting from the Iranian revolution in January 
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1979 set off that decade’s second oil crisis.  As inflation climbed, Carter’s approval rating fell to 
21 per cent, its lowest level since ratings began (Wayne, 1992: 260).  ‘Washingtonians joked that 
he was the first President with poll ratings lower than the prime interest rate’ (Boller, 1996: 355). 
The need to reduce inflation constricted the liberal agenda, and induced friction between 
Democratic policymakers and their interest group allies.  Inflation drove the administration 
towards wage and price guidelines, and tighter fiscal and monetary policies, which the trade 
unions abhorred.  As the experience of the Callaghan government in Britain suggests, the 
exigencies of the international economy at this time produced tensions, and sometimes 
confrontations, between social democratic governments and their core constituencies (Krieger, 
1986: 25). 
In 1980 inflation rose to 15.2 percent (Appendix A).  Federal Reserve Board (Fed) 
Chairman Paul Volcker believed the only remedy was tightening the money supply (Krugman, 
1990).  In March 1980, the President invoked the Credit Control Act, asking the Fed to impose 
new controls on credit.  However, this inadvertently reduced borrowing, producing a decline in 
economic growth which slowed to 0.3 per cent (Appendix A) (Byron 1980a: 44).  Consequently, 
the Fed sought to lower the discount rate.  However, the Carter administration’s massive budget 
deficits deepened the Fed’s dilemma.  Figure 1 shows that all measures of GDP growth were 
stagnant, while GNI per capita growth collapsed between 1979 and 1982.   
 
Figure 1: America (1973-1983) GDP Growth(%); GDP per capita growth(%); GDP growth(5 yr. 
av); GNI per capita growth (%) 
 
Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database 
 
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) declared the US in recession in 
June 1980 (Time, 1980a: 48), while the Commerce Department reported that leading economic 
indicators had suffered their largest declines in a generation.1  By August the Fed was reporting 
                                                          
1 The Washington Post, 1 June 1980, p. A1. 
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that the country’s factories had operated at 74.2 per cent of capacity in July, their lowest level in 
five years.2 
By the second half of 1980 the administration’s responses to the recession smacked of 
crisis-management.  President Carter’s $32.2 billion stimulus package, unveiled in early 
September, was criticized as ‘a weak smorgasbord of morsels instead of a bold strategy.’3  The 
proposed tax reductions were seen as an admission that incomes policy was incapable of coping 
with inflation.4 
The tighter Fed policy, and higher interest rates, provoked Carter to condemn Fed 
Chairman Volcker.  Although the White House supported Volcker’s struggle with inflation, 
Carter had grown concerned over the impact of interest rates on his re-election bid.5  The Fed’s 
shifting monetary policies – slowing the growth of the money supply to restrain inflation, then 
permitting it expand to prevent the recession getting out of hand, before tightening the money 
supply again – contributed to gyrations in the economy (Church et al., 1981: 44).  Prominent 
economists criticized the Fed’s actions, saying they cast doubt on whether it intended to meet its 
commitment to slow the growth of the money supply to combat inflation.’6 
Despite declaring the economy to be in recession7, Volcker intended maintaining high 
interest rates to keep a rein on the money supply and curb inflation.8  The Fed ultimately pushed 
interest rates to their highest levels in a century, slowing borrowing by businesses and 
individuals alike, and sending the housing and automobile industries into a decline (Time, 1980a: 
50).  ‘Through the joint actions of the Reserve Board and the administration, the economy had 
been inadvertently plunged into the kind of major recession the White House had been trying to 
avoid’ (Dark, 1999: 120). 
 
 
The United States of America 1980/1981 – The Policy Response 
The imposition of controls on consumer credit contributed to the economy’s slide and to 
widespread dissatisfaction with, and critiques of, government policy (Byron 1980a: 44).  The 
economy was in what Arthur Okun called “the great stagflation swamp” (Byron 1980b: 17).  
Alan Greenspan observed that, in allowing the economy deteriorate Carter was forced into a 
crash program of restraint that lead to a rise in unemployment (Byron, 1980b: 19).  Critiques of 
extant policy coalesced around alternative ideas purporting to tackle the economy’s ills, namely 
monetarism. 
 The monetarist ideas of Milton Friedman, and Robert Lucas, as propounded by 
organizations such as the American Enterprise Institute, had been present in political circles 
since the early 1970s (Blyth 1997: 236–37).  Such organizations ensured that economic 
journalism propagated their theories (Blyth, 1997: 237), with the Wall Street Journal acting as 
‘effective synthesizer and chief proselytizer for these ... ideas’ (Blyth 2002: 164).  Thus, a clear 
set of alternative ideas, and policy entrepreneurs, were present.  Ronald Reagan embraced this 
ideology. 
                                                          
2 ibid., 19 August, p. D6.  
3 The New York Times, 2 September 1980, p. 12. 
4 ibid., 5 October, 1980, p. 8. 
5 The Washington Post, 3 October 1980, p. A1. 
6 The Wall Street Journal, 2 October, 1980. 
7 ibid., 20 November 1980, p. B1. 
8 ibid., 23 September, p. D1. 
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 Reagan’s message was to reduce taxes, spending on social services, government 
regulations, and the size of government itself in order to balance the budget.  He favoured 
increased defense spending, and efforts to encourage the collapse of Communism.  Where Barry 
Goldwater failed in 1964, Reagan was convinced he could triumph in 1980.  He blamed the 
Democrats’ inflationary policies for stifling productivity and that they had “created a severe 
depression” (Kelly 1980: 9).  The causes of the 1970s inflation were far more complex than 
simply the growth of the money supply (rising oil prices, falling productivity, declining value of 
the dollar) due to increased federal spending, but Reagan, acting as Friedman’s translator, placed 
things in this context (Madrick, 2009: 6). 
During the final stages of the election Reagan declared Carter’s record on inflation and 
unemployment “a failure on a scale so vast, in dimensions so broad, with effects so devastating, 
that it is virtually without parallel” (Church 1980: 17).  Reagan attacked Carter for permitting a 
doubling in the so-called misery index (Okun’s discomfort index) that Carter had badgered 
Gerald Ford with during the 1976 campaign (Time, 1980b: 45).  Through this approach Reagan 
forged an electoral coalition around the notion of monetarism (Blyth 1997). 
 On 4 November Reagan was elected President in a neo-conservative avalanche that 
carried 44 per cent of the trade union vote9, traditionally some of the Democrats strongest 
supporters.  Carter had inherited a bad situation, but left it worse.  The new administration’s 
economic policies were different from those of its predecessor in their political roots and 
theoretical foundations (OECD, 1982a: 9).  To combat stagflation he promoted a painless 
panacea: tax cuts based on the proposals of Arthur Laffer, and deregulation, wherein the 
resulting stimulus would boost revenues to balance the budget, reducing inflationary pressure. 
The new president’s program, dubbed Reaganomics, constituted the belief that American 
capitalism, freed from the burden of taxes and regulation, would surge ahead. Reagan’s first 
budget proposed $750 billion in tax cuts over three years (Jones, 1995: 597).  The administration 
also cut $11 billion from public works, job training programs, and unemployment benefits 
(Brown, 1981: A1).  According to the OECD (1982a: 24) ‘a trend towards reduced economic 
regulation was carried further by the immediate application of the remaining stages of crude oil 
price decontrol and the abolition of the Council on Wage and Price Stability.’  That said, Reagan 
did not so much reduce the tax burden as shift it, with the fall in income tax being complimented 
by an increase in payroll taxes for social security (Madrick, 2009: 21).  At the same time 
spending was redirected into a huge peacetime military build up. 
 Reagan, acting as political entrepreneur, capitalized on anti-government sentiment, 
emphasizing individualism and a smaller Federal role.  Tax relief was allied to a restructuring of 
federal expenditure, bringing sharp changes in the fiscal influence on the economy.  Reagan won 
the election by having a discernible set of alternative ideas which could replace extant 
arrangements.  The result was a clear mandate for neo-conservative policies (OECD 1982a: 10).  
D’Souza (1997: 85) saw Reagan’s program as the most ambitious since the New Deal.   
 
 
Mexico 1981/1982 – The State of the Economy 
 
After the Second World War Mexico implemented an import substitution policy (Narula, 2002).  
This encompassed protecting the agrarian and consumer goods sectors behind import quotas 
                                                          
9 The Washington Post, 16 February, 1981, p.  A1. 
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(González, 2005).  The model succeeded as there was demand for Mexican raw materials.  
However, it created a private sector dependent upon state protection (Hernandez, 2008)10.   
Import substitution was superseded by a policy referred to as stabilizing development in the 
1960s (Salinas, 1999).  This focused on enhancing productivity and competitiveness 
(McCaughan 1993; Salinas 1999).   
When President López Portillo came to power in 1976 he inherited a balance of payments 
deficit, sectorial disequilibrium; and socioeconomic inequalities threatening political stability 
(Alarcon and McKinley 1992).  This was partly due to the effect of the 1973 oil crisis (Mexico 
was a net oil importer at the time), the resultant worldwide recession, falling agricultural exports, 
rapid population growth, and middle class disillusionment with its inability to express itself in a 
one party (Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)) dominated culture signalled the end of 
stabilising development (Rubio11, 2008).  Following the oil crisis the government expanded 
expenditure and increased its intervention in the economy (Lustig, 1998).  This, combined with a 
negative agricultural supply shocks, led to inflation reaching 20 per cent in 1974 (Moreno-Bird 
and Ros, 2009: 129). 
However, in 1978 Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the state oil company, discovered 
huge oil reserves, and with the second oil crisis in 1979, an oil boom followed (Székely, 1983; 
McCaughan 1993).  The hope was that oil revenues would stabilize the economy (Calderón-
Madrid, 1997).  However, this only circumvented the danger of immediate crisis, without 
resolving the economy’s structural problems (Nelson, 1990: 95). 
 Once Mexico became a net petroleum exporter pressure grew to expand public spending 
(Bailey, 1980).  ‘Rather than pay the political price that sweeping redistributive policies – 
especially tax reform – would have entailed, the Portillo administration (1976-1982) sought to 
expand the economic pie and increase the role of the state in the economy’ (Cornelius, 1985: 88).  
As the number of state owned enterprises quadrupled, expenditure outstripped petroleum 
revenues and an anaemic taxation system (Calderón-Madrid, 1997; Solís, 1981).  To finance 
these projects Mexico borrowed $78bn. by 1981 (Alarcon and McKinley, 1992).  The economy 
began to overheat, and as inflation surpassed 25 percent in 1981 the peso became overvalued, 
and the competiveness of exports, apart from oil, diminished (McCaughan, 1993).   
Recession in the US reduced demand for Mexican goods, and weakened the international 
oil market, while a sharp increase in interest rates there reduced the money supply, and put 
pressure on Mexico’s debt servicing, as US banks had lent the country $25 billion.  Servicing 
Mexico’s total debt reached $16 billion in 1982, more than its revenues from oil (Cornelius, 
1985: 89).  As oil prices fell, in response to a weakening international economy, PEMEX 
declared oil production would be insufficient to reactivate the economy.12  ‘Collapsing oil prices 
and rising international interest rates erased Mexico’s prosperity’ (Starr, 2006: 53).  The critical 
error by the Mexican government had been to see high and increasing oil prices as a permanent 
feature of the international economy, while increasing interest rates were regarded as a 
temporary phenomenon (Moreno-Bird and Ros, 2009: 135). 
                                                          
10 Luis Miguel Beristain Hernandez, PhD in Administrative Sciences.  Business and Politics professor, Director of 
Professional Development, Enterprise Development and Social Development at ITESM (Interviewed July 2008). 
11Luis Rubio, PhD in Political Science. Mexican writer on politics, and economics. (Interviewed July 2008). 
12 Magazine Nexos, Sociedad, Ciencia y Literatura,. January, 1982.  “De Díaz Mirón a Díaz Serrano”. 
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By 1982, as confidence in the economy waned, Mexicans began converting pesos to 
dollars at 25 billion a day (Sancton et al., 1982: 40).  The gravity of the situation came to 
international attention on August 13, 1982, when:   
 
The government fired the shot heard around the world, announcing that it could 
not meet interest payments coming due within the next few days and initiating 
negotiations for bridge loans and rescheduling agreements with the US Treasury, 
the IMF, and the private commercial banks. (Nelson, 1990: 97)  
 
GDP contracted by 0.6 per cent in 1982 and 4.2 per cent in 1983 (Appendix A).  As Figure 4 
shows, all measures of GDP were in decline by the early 1980s, while GNI per capita growth 
underwent the largest collapse of the countries examined.  Inflation reached 58.92 percent in 1982 
(Katz, 1994).  Output fell in all industries,13 unemployment jumped towards 15 percent,14 while 
more than 20 million people, half the workforce, were underemployed (Cornelius, 1985: 92).  
Compounding matters, US banks stopped lending to Mexican companies as they owed US$600 
million in unpaid interest.15  The budget deficit stood at 16.5 percent of GDP.16   
 
Figure 4: Mexico (1974-1984) GDP Growth(%); GDP per capita growth(%); GDP growth(5 yr. 
av); GNI per capita growth (%) 
 
Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database 
 
This was the worst crisis to hit Mexico since the Great Depression (Edwards, 1995: 17).  
Minimum wages were insufficient to meet the needs of most Mexicans (Lustig, 1986).  Opinion 
polls found great scepticism concerning the economy (Basañez, 1985).  Whereas the 1970s had 
seen an influx of FDI, the early 1980s witnessed its flight (Edwards, 1995).  Despite growing by 
                                                          
13 ibid. 
14 ibid, 20 December, 1982. 
15 ibid, 1 January, 1983. 
16 ibid., 20 December, 1982. 
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8 per cent annually between 1978 and 1981, by the end of 1982, Mexico faced one of the 
severest crises in its history (Barker and Brailovsky, 1983).  
 
 
Mexico 1981/1982 – The Policy Response 
 
By mid March 1982, President Portillo’s administration was scrambling to save the economy 
(Taylor and Lopez, 1982: 38).  During the 1982 presidential election all contenders focused on 
the crisis.  However, as Mexico was an evolving democracy, opposition parties were not 
sufficiently strong to challenge PRI’s position.  Miguel De La Madrid, a fiscal conservative, was 
the PRI’s candidate.17  He was ‘among the leaders of the conservative faction based in the 
treasury’ (Nelson, 1990: 98).  His selection constituted a rupture with the PRI’s rhetoric of 
harking back to a revolutionary ideology (Cárdenas, 2008)18.  However, Mexican society was in 
turmoil, and free market supporters wanted a president who would support the rights of private 
property (Luna et al., 1987). 
In his inaugural address De La Madrid declared a new economic approach was needed.19  
However, ‘policy options and instruments appeared limited [for Mexico], which as a debtor was 
subject to the conditionality imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’ (Golob, 2003: 
375).  The fact that the IMF was dictating policy indicates that political entrepreneurship for 
Mexico had moved from the domestic to the international context.  Sources of external finance 
had dried up in the aftermath of the crisis (Hernandez, 2008).  Even when oil prices rose, the 
industry did not have the capacity take advantage.  De La Madrid wanted to take policy to the 
right, stabilizing and opening the economy (Lustig, 1992: 28).  The new government sought to 
keep domestic interest rates competitive (Looney, 1985: 112), while incentivising exports.  For 
decades free trade had been ‘the policy option that dare not speak its name’ (Golob, 2003: 370).  
An austerity program – Programa Inmediato de Reordenacion Economica – was introduced 
(Lustig, 1998: 29), along with a draconian budget for a 50 percent deficit reduction20. 
 The government ‘embraced an approach toward liberalisation, privatisation and 
deregulation’ (Pastor and Wise, 1997:  421).  However, a major concern was Mexico’s inability 
to compete in foreign markets, and its inadequate level of saving.21  The administration signalled 
its desire for FDI by relaxing investment restriction (Cornelius, 1985: 115), permitting Mexican 
businesses form international partnerships (Tournaud, 2008).  These policies had a significant 
impact upon economic, and social, development (Cornelius, 1985: 84).   
During 1982 the peso was devaluated twice to increase exports (Katz, 1994).  However, 
the exchange rate with the dollar collapsed from 23 peso to the dollar in 1980 to 143 in 1983.  De 
La Madrid also sought a less confrontational approach to the IMF (Nelson, 1990: 63).  
‘Acceptance of the IMF embrace [was] a major break-through’ (ISG, 1982: 1720), as it permitted 
Mexico avoid a debt moratorium (Looney, 1985: 121).  The reduction in government spending 
enabled Mexico reach its IMF targets for reducing the public sector deficit.  However, this had a 
                                                          
17 ibid. 5 October, 1981. 
18 Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. Mexican politician, active in Mexican politics in the 1980s and important political 
representative of Mexico’s opposition parties (Partido de la Revolución Democrática [PRD]).   
19 First Annual Presidential Report of President Miguel De La Madrid, 1September, 1983. 
20 ibid.   
21 Latin America Regional Reports, 4 June, 1982, pp. 1-2. 
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recessionary impact (Pastor and Wise, 1997: 421) as fiscal and monetary solutions proposed by 
the IMF and OECD (changing from import substitution to export promotion) failed to take 
account of the global contraction (Allen et al., 1992). 
De La Madrid recognised that his administration could not rely on oil exports.22  The 
solution to financing development was sought through privatising public enterprises, of which 
1,155 were sold off (Hernandez, 2008).  De La Madrid sought to combine macroeconomic 
stabilisation and structural change, with a focus on export orientated manufacturing (Cornelius, 
1985: 110).   
The Economic Solidarity Pact was introduced in 1987.  Signed by business, labour, and 
peasant leaders, its objectives were to further reduce the fiscal deficit, tighter monetary policy, 
the liberalisation of trade, and a comprehensive agreement on incomes’ control (Lustig, 1992: 
51).  This increased flexibility in collective bargaining contracts by reducing fringe benefits, 
union influence, and privileges (Serrano, 1997).   
Although these austerity measures resulted in labour unrest, the relationship between the 
private sector and the state transformed over the 1980s (Middlebrook, 2004).  Neoliberal reforms 
made the private sector a key player in reviving the economy (Beristain, 2008; Tournaud, 2008).    
Business organisations became engaged in debates over economic policy, where previously the 
private sector had been kept at a remove (Golob, 2003: 371).  As a result, business confidence 
improved (Warnock, 1995).  These events opened the way for increased democratization.  Thus, 
Mexican economic history can be divided into before, and after, 1982 (Cárdenas, 2008; Serra-
Puche, 2008).  Mexico started down a different path under De La Madrid. 
 
 
Ireland 1981/1982 – The State of the Economy 
 
The latter years of the 1970s saw the Irish economy recover from the downturn following the 
1973 oil crisis.  Inflation and unemployment began to fall, while growth returned (Leddin and 
Walsh, 1998: 26).  Real GDP increased by about 5.3 per cent from 1976 to 1979 (OECD, 1982b: 
8).  However, the Fianna Fáil government that came to power in 1977 employed an expansionist 
fiscal policy when the economy was growing at an unsustainable rate (OECD, 1982b: 10).  
Strong pro-cyclical fiscal policies led to deterioration in fiscal balances, with the public sector-
borrowing requirement increasing from 13 percent of GNP in 1976 to 20.1 percent in 1981.  The 
structural problems highlighted during the first oil crisis remained unresolved by the time the 
second crisis struck in the wake of the Iranian revolution.  This exacerbated inflationary 
pressures, and resulted in record deficits in both the current external balance and the public 
sector accounts (OECD, 1983: 7).  The government implemented expansionary policies in 1980 
on account of the worsening international economic climate, increasing unemployment and 
emigration (OECD 1982b: 50).  However, this increased inflation to 18.2 per cent in 1980 
(Appendix A).  
Adjustment to the European Monetary System (EMS), entered in 1979 after severing the 
link with Sterling, initially failed to bring inflation down.  Following its rapid growth in the 
second half of the 1970s domestic demand fell in 1980 and remained weak in 1981.  Reducing 
inflation, the elimination of government borrowing, and the provision of increased incentives for 
industry were all seen as essential to righting the economy.  By 1981 GDP growth had fallen to 
                                                          
22 The Third World Magazine, December, 1983, p. 72. 
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1.1 per cent, while Figure 3 shows that all measures of GDP were stagnant.  Additionally, GNI 
per capita growth declined between 1980 and 1982. Unemployment reached 9.3, with the 
manufacturing industry experiencing a fall in output of 2 per cent and the loss of 10,000 jobs, 
while the building industry was also in recession (NESC, 1981: 1-3).  Coinciding with the 
slowdown in GDP growth the rate of unemployment and inflation rose towards historically high 
figures (Appendix D), despite government commitments to full employment (OECD, 1982b: 10).   
 
Figure 3: Ireland (1973-1983) GDP Growth(%); GDP per capita growth(%); GDP growth (5 yr. 
av); GNI per 
 
Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database 
 
The fiscal deficit, intended to be temporary, became impossible to eliminate in an 
economic climate of decline.  By 1981 Irish national debt reached £10.195 billion, of which £3.7 
billion was external (Leddin and Walsh, 1998: 155-156).  Leddin and O’Leary (1995: 167) state 
that at this time the public sector borrowing requirement peaked at 20.1 per cent of GNP, the 
national debt stood at 80 percent of GNP, while the current budget deficit stood at an equally 
unsustainable 7.3 per cent of GNP.  The balance of payments deficit was 13 per cent of GNP.23  
Almost half Exchequer borrowing in 1981 went to financing the current budget deficit (Bacon et 
al., 1982: 6).  Fianna Fáil’s policies reduced growth from over five per cent in 1977 to effectively 
zero by 1981, and in the same period doubled the national debt.  The government’s spending was 
so high the total amount budgeted for 1981 had been consumed by June. 
The need to control public expenditure, reduce the deficit, and prevent excessive reliance 
on foreign borrowing, dictated the adoption tighter fiscal policies.  However, the catch-all nature 
of Irish political parties imposed an inducement on governments to buy off short-term pressure 
from interest groups through ad hoc policy concessions.  This worked against consistency in 
imposing severe economic policies, and formulating enduring agreements between the state and 
economic interest groups found in Continental neo-corporatism.  When the Irish government 
                                                          
23 Central Bank of Ireland, Annual Report, 1982, p. 16.  
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made an economic policy decision they were usually loath to stick with it for fear of alienating 
some group of supporters. 
 
 
Ireland 1981/1982 – The Policy Response 
 
The 1981 general election saw a minority coalition government of Fine Gael and Labour replace 
Fianna Fáil.  At a most inopportune time, the country found itself condemned to, what proved to 
be, a period of weak and unstable government (Walsh, 1981: 1).  The new government sought to 
bring order to the public finances, constraining rising public service pay more tightly the 
previous Administration (FitzGerald, 1991: 385).  The supplementary budget introduced in July 
1981 was designed to reduce the central government borrowing requirement and the balance of 
payments deficit.  However, being a minority Administration made it difficult for the 
government to maintain it policies, and its time in office proved a matter of daily crisis 
management (O’Byrnes, 1986). 
Not only economically, but politically, instability peaked in 1981-1982 (Mjoset, 1992: 
381).  Between June 1981 to November 1982 three general elections brought a change of 
government.  The minority Fine Gael-Labour Coalition fell on budget day 1982.  It was 
succeeded by a minority Fianna Fáil administration in March.  In autumn 1982 the Fianna Fáil’s 
government’s cutbacks alienated the independent deputies supporting it and the government 
collapsed (Collins, 1992: 62). 
By 1982, although all Parties agreed on the need to stabilize the debt/GNP ratio (Mjoset, 
1992: 381).  The ideas underpinning economic growth of the 1970s, Keynesian and neo-
corporatism (Bew et al. 1989), were abandoned, as balancing the budget became critical.  But, 
apart from crisis-induced cutbacks, no coherent ideas/policy options emerged, as the 
governments of this period were of such short duration and unstable character.   
The general election of November 1982 was won by a majority Fine Gael-Labour 
Coalition which remained in power until 1987.  By November 1982, with national debt 
exceeding GNP, and the current budget deficit spiralling out of control, a coherent corrective 
policy was essential.  Thus, the state of the public finances permitted the government little scope 
for action other than austerity measures.  All political parties became committed to curbing 
public expenditure as an essential precondition for economic recovery (Munck, 1993: 38).  
However, the Coalition government experienced difficulty in devising an effective strategy 
(O’Byrnes, 1986: 219). 
The deflationary medicine was first applied in early 1983 with cutbacks in health 
spending and the public capital programme (O’Gráda, 1997).  However, with the economy 
stagnating unemployment more than doubled between 1980 and 1985, and as a result 
government spending on social services jumped from 28.9 per cent of GNP in 1980 to 35.6 per 
cent by 1985 (Leddin and Walsh, 1998: 302).  By the mid 1980s the economy was in a 
downward spiral, with high taxes and interest rates depressing investment and productive 
capacity.  Control over current spending proved difficult with high unemployment and rapid 
population growth.  The economy over 1980-1985 marked a major discontinuity with the 
experience of the 1970s (NESC, 1986: 2).  By the mid-1980s unemployment was being offset by 
emigration (OECD, 1986: 12). 
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By 1987 the national debt had tripled to 130 per cent of GNP (McCarthy, 1999).  
Nevertheless, over its four and a half years in power the Fine Gael-Labour coalition succeeded in 
cutting inflation from 17 per cent to less than 4 percent, and the borrowing requirement was 
almost halved to 13 percent of GNP.  Nevertheless, the macroeconomic policies introduced to 
shelter Ireland from the consequences of the oil shocks of the 1970s, and political recklessness, 
had led to unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances.  The period 1980 to 1987 was one of 
prolonged recession, falling living standards, huge unemployment, and emigration (O’Donnell 
1998, 6). 
Additionally, the Fine Gael wing of the coalition decided that the social partners had no 
right to influence economic policy (Jacobsen, 1994).  Thus, the centralised agreements (between 
the trade unions, employers, and government) that, by the late 1970s had acquired a 
macroeconomic significance, as they became wide-ranging wage and policy accords, were ended 
as the government considered the terms that characterised them incompatible with curbing 
spending (Cox, 1983).  Thus, many interest groups, especially the trade unions, found themselves 
removed from the corridors of power (Roche, 1994: 172).   
 
 
Sweden 1981/1982 – The State of the Economy 
 
After the 1973 oil crisis Sweden experienced recession and stagflation.  This contributed to the 
Social Democratic Party’s (Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet (SAP)) loss of power for the first 
time in 44 years in 1976.  The SAP had been the most dominant political party in Western 
European politics (Bergstrom, 1991: 6).  Thereafter, the SAP shifted more to the right of the 
political spectrum.  The non-socialist government commissioned reports on the economy that 
were all infused with ‘the rising currents of monetarism, public choice theory, and neo-liberalism 
that were to come to the fore in the coming decade’ (Andersson, 2006: 101).  The second oil 
crisis reinforced the impact of the first.  Economic performance during the first two years of the 
1980s was particularly poor.  Furthermore, in spite of the adjustment policies pursued by the 
authorities, correction of the imbalances that had built up since the 1970s was slow, and the 
economy remained in disequilibrium (OECD, 1984: 7).   
Growth in public expenditure outstripped growth of the economy (OECD, 1984: 9).  The 
public sector’s share of GNP rose under the non-socialists (1976-1982), so that by 1982 public 
sector expenditure constituted 67 percent of GNP (OECD, 1990: 59).  This explains how the 
number of public sector jobs increased by 43 percent between 1972 and 1982, coming to 
outnumber those in private industry after 1978 (Gress, 1988).  Productivity growth declined 
significantly from 1970 onwards due to the size of the public-sector (Lindbeck, 1997).  This had 
a knock on effect on the level of exports, which stagnated over the decade (Ryden and 
Bergstrom, 1982).  Worryingly, Sweden’s share of the world economy dropped 40 percent 
during that decade (Peterson, 1987).  Foreign competition made substantial inroads on the 
Swedish domestic market, as suggested by the steady rise in the share of imported manufactured 
goods (OECD, 1984: 12).  
Central government’s expenditure grew at a faster pace by the end of the 1970s than at 
the beginning of the decade, while revenues stagnated.  The budget deficits were financed 
through borrowing.  However, there was no political mandate for either radical budget cuts or 
revenue enhancements.  To avoid internal disputes, the non-socialists parties in government 
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wanted neither to raise taxes nor be accused of trying to dismantle the welfare state (Branegan, 
1982: 32). 
In 1981 inflation hit 12.1 percent and unemployment reached 3.1 per cent in 1982, its 
highest level since 1945 (Appendix A).  Although this would have been a low figure elsewhere, 
it was a scandal in a country accustomed to full employment (Apple Jr. 1982: 3).  However, 
many economists believed unemployment was closer to 16 per cent if it included the jobless in 
training programs, workers forced into early retirement and those who had given up looking for 
work (Branegan, 1982: 32).   
For Swedes this was an unprecedented situation.  Economic growth, which had averaged 
2.5 per cent throughout the 1970s, contracted in 1981 and expanded by only 1 per cent in 1982.  
Figure 4 shows that all indicators of GDP growth were low in the early 1980s, while GNI per 
capita growth collapsed.  In the context of the international recession of the early 1980s, the 
budget deficit prevented the government pursuing a counter-cyclical fiscal policy.  
 
Figure 8: Sweden (1974-1984) GDP Growth(%); GDP per capita growth(%); GDP growth(5 yr. 
av); GNI per capita growth (%) 
 
Source: Data Gob, Government Indicators Database 
 
With a sluggish economy, stagnant revenues, and rising expenditures, the government’s 
budget deficits accelerated during the 1970s, reaching 13 per cent of GNP in 1982 (Siven, 1984).  
The Riksbank predicted that ‘the deficit on the national budget would grow from around SKr78 
billion under the 1982-83 budget to some SKr90 billion in 1983-1984’ (Dullforce, 1982: 1).  ‘In 
an international context, both the level of the budget deficit, and the swing in the budget balance 
since the mid-1970s has been more pronounced than in most other OECD countries’ (OECD, 
1982c: 16).  By 1982 Sweden’s debt/GNP ratio stood at 59.3 per cent, whereas 12 month before 
it had been 50.8 per cent, its growth an indication of the size of the budget deficit.  The Swedish 
debt/GNP ratio increased by 250 percent in 6 years.   
 The New York Times argued that the Swedish economy, once the envy of Europe, had 
been hobbled by foreign debt, an adverse balance of payments, slow growth, and unemployment.  
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Compounding matters, Swedes were reluctant to see the welfare state cut back and to accept the 
remedies proposed to deal with their problems (Financial Times, 18 September 1982: 15).   
 
 
Sweden 1981/1982 – The Policy Response 
In autumn 1981 a 10 percent devaluation of the krona was conducted, and in the spring of 1982 
the non-socialist coalition government introduced an austerity program.  However, the 
opposition SAP gained in popularity (Hadenius, 1997: 129-30).  The non-socialists wanted to 
neither raise taxes, nor be accused of dismantling the welfare state (Branegan, 1982: 32).   
The 1982 election was dominated by talk of economic crisis (Osnos 1982: A15).  During 
the campaign the SAP, under Olof Plame, attacked the viability of another non-socialist 
government.  The party presented a Crisis Programme on how Sweden could save and work its 
way out of crisis.  The economic problems, and Cabinet crises, deprived the non-socialist 
government of credibility (Mjoset, 1992).  SAP won the election with a set of proposals to 
correct extant policies and right an economy.   
The new SAP government implemented a recovery program: the Third Way (Apple Jr. 
1982: 3).  It argued that renewed growth required redistribution of income from labour to capital.  
This also marked a major change in SAP economic planning, behind which lay the influence of 
its research department which, since 1976, had achieved ascendancy over the Trade Union 
Confederation’s (Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO)) research department within the labour 
movement (Meidner, 1989).  The subsequent cuts in the public sector and restraint in wage 
negotiations resulted in deep divisions between the SAP and the LO (Andersson, 2006: 116). 
 The Third Way, an attempt to maintain a level of social democracy (Martin, 2000: 234), 
was a wide-ranging stabilization program encompassing demand management measures, as well 
as initiatives to promote structural change and ensure an equitable distribution of the burden of 
adjustment (OECD, 1984: 21).  The SAP was determined to pour funds into job-creating 
industries, and to increase taxes for that purpose.  The party planned to spend $100 million, and 
hoped to attract an addition $350 million in private investment, to create 30,000 jobs (Apple, 
1982: 3).  The centerpiece of Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt’s strategy was the devaluation of 
the krona by 16 per cent.  The SAP had identified labour costs as the key to international 
competiveness.  This was implemented in conjunction with a price freeze and increases in sales 
and corporate taxes, in a sweeping “crisis plan” to stimulate the economy and eliminate its 
imbalances (Dullforce 1982: 1). 
The LO, the largest union association, accommodated devaluation by demanding average 
wage increases of 2.5 per cent in ensuing bargaining.  The devaluation, and international 
economic recovery, resulted in high earnings and export expansion (Ahlén 1989: 333).  The 
thrust of SAP policies pointed in a different direction than previously, with Feldt determined to 
give priority to private sector growth, profits, and market forces.  A series of structural reforms 
were introduced overturning the traditional priorities of the SAP.  Under pressure for more 
individual freedom, and the internationalisation of the economy, these reforms saw the SAP 
move in a neo-liberal direction (Taylor, 1991: 17).   
Fiscal policy was held tight, and the slimming of the public sector would, it was argued, 
create crowding in effects (Mjoset, 1992: 349).  The public sector austerity strategy, with a profit 
explosion and wage restraint, created tension between the SAP and LO.  Nevertheless, the 
government restored welfare entitlements cut by the non-socialists (OECD, 1984: 23).   
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To placate the LO, the SAP, in the face of Swedish Employers’ Federation (Svenska 
Arbetsgivarforening (SAF))  opposition, introduced wage-earner funds in 1983.  In 1976 the LO 
proposed that a levy on corporate profits be used to transfer control of enterprises with more than 
50 employees to the unions.  At the time the SAP had been sceptical about the idea (Whyman 
and Burkitt, 1993: 612).  ‘Industrialists regarded the funds as a device to achieve bureaucratic 
control of industry’ (Gress, 1988: 130).  However, the version implemented in 1983 been heavily 
modified from Rudolf Meidner’s proposal in 1976 (Gould, 1993).  It had transformed ‘from an 
overtly socialist union proposal to a number of toothless share holding funds’ (Meidner, 1993: 
223).  However, the modified version of the funds also dissatisfied the LO (Lewin, 1985a: 296).   
To maintain the welfare state the SAP had prioritized private sector growth.  The third 
way marked a reversal in the SAP’s perspective on social policy, moving from an investment in 
growth, to costs that needed to be reduced (Andersson, 2006: 124).     
 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has provided an insight into how four countries sought to deal with the economic 
crises afflicting them at the start of the 1980s.  Their responses to these crises, which, to some 
extent, could trace their origins to the oil shocks of the 1970s, were dictated by country specific 
combinations of political, policy and economic concerns.  In this respect, the responses of each 
of the countries were different, and it is these differences that led to the unique policies the 
countries pursued. 
 In the case of the US, the long term decline in its dominant economic position, combined 
with various administrations’ inability to damp down the inflationary pressures building in the 
wake of the 1973 oil shock, led to a crisis in the economy.  In response to this crisis President 
Ronald Reagan sought to take economic policy in a different, if not altogether coherent, 
direction, reorientating taxes, deregulating, and redirecting government spending away from 
social welfare programs and towards the military.  Reagan saw himself as an advocate of classic 
liberal economic thinking, though his military expenditure could be seen as Keynesian.  During 
his time in office the economy recovered and grew robustly, with unemployment and inflation 
falling.  However, the national debt increased greatly over this period.  This was to prove a debt 
legacy which future administrations and generations would have to grapple with. 
 For Mexico, the 1973 oil crisis, uncompetitive industries, and a growing population, 
placed strains upon its economy.  However, the discovery of vast oil reserves in the late 1970s 
seemed a panacea.  Oil was used to finance the expansion of the public sector.  However, much 
additional finance came in loans from the US, which, by the early 1980s, was in recession and 
experiencing high interest rates.  This reduced demand for Mexican exports, and simultaneously 
added to the cost of servicing the US borrowing.  Relying upon oil as a permanent source of 
increasing income, while paying insufficient heed to rising interest rates, damaged the economy.  
In response to the crisis the PRI moved to the right under De La Madrid.  The increased 
importance of the private sector to the management of the economy led to its increasing 
involvement in policy making, opening the way for greater democratization of Mexican society 
in later years.  
 In Ireland, a combination of the oil shocks, and the unnecessary implementation of a pro-
cyclical fiscal policy in the late 1970s, brought the economy to its knees in the early 1980s.  By 
1981, as the international economy was going into recession, the Irish national debt, budget 
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deficit and inflation rate were all approaching record levels.  Measures to stem the budget deficit 
and national debt proved futile as economy went into a vicious downward spiral.  Irish political 
parties being catchall in nature worked against their imposing harsh economic policies.  
Throughout 1981/82 three changes of government impeded the implementation of a consistent 
approach to righting the economy.  By the mid 1980s emigration was reducing the level of 
unemployment and the population.  It would be 1987 before the economy began to very slowly 
recover. 
 In Sweden, the impact of the oil shocks, combined with the slowdown in economic 
growth, began pushing the economic policies to the right.  The growth in public sector 
expenditure, and public sector employment, became unsustainably expensive, and at the same 
time reduced productivity.  Economic growth slowed, unemployment and inflation rose, and the 
budget deficit and national debt expanded rapidly.  In response, the SAP government in 1982 
shifted economic policy to the right, moving itself away from the position of its LO ally.  The 
Third Way programme placed the priority on private sector growth and market forces, while 
shrinking the public sector was seen a necessary to make the economy more dynamic, and 
growth orientated.  Even the introduction of the wage-earner funds was conducted in a half 
hearted manner, with the form they took being very different from originally envisaged.  The 
emphasis of economic policy had shifted from the public to the private sector, and away from 
traditional socialism.        
 
 
Appendix A  
Country/Year Unemployment  Inflation  Debt/GNP ratio GDP Growth 
Rates  
Interest Rates 
America      
1979 5.7 11.3 33.1 2.4 13 
1980 7.0 13.5 33.3 -0.3 15 
1981 7.5 10.4 32.5 2.3 19 
1982 9.7 3.8 35.2 -2.1 15 
Mexico      
1980 4.2 26.36 30.53 9.22 22 
1981 4.2 27.93 32.59 8.77 28 
1982 6.8 58.92 53.3 -0.63 41 
1983 6.9 101.7 66.53 -4.2 60 
Ireland      
1980 7.3 18.2 71.91 1.9 16 
1981 9.9 20.4 77.45 1.1 16 
1982 11.4 17.1 86.53 -0.7 17 
1983 13.6 10.5 97.60 -1.6 14 
Sweden       
1980 2.0 13.7 43.2 1.9 15 
1981 2.5 12.1 50.8 -0.6 17 
1982 3.1 8.6 59.3 1.1 17 
1983 3.5 9.0 64.6 1.8 15 
Sources: Leddin and Walsh (1998); Mitchell (1993); Eurostat Yearbook 1997.  Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities; Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table 
Version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP); World Bank Group, 
World Development Indicators WDI Online,  http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/ 
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